What Constitutes  Doing Business  by Foreign Corporations by Keane, Steven E. & Collins, John R.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 42
Issue 2 Fall 1958 Article 1




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Steven E. Keane and John R. Collins, What Constitutes "Doing Business" by Foreign Corporations, 42 Marq. L. Rev. 151 (1958).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol42/iss2/1
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Vol. 42 FALL, 1958 No. 2
CHANGING CONCEPTS OF WHAT
CONSTITUTES "DOING BUSINESS"
BY FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
STEVEN E. KEANE* AND JOHN R. COLLINS**
I. INTRODUCTION
The authors agree that, in lieu of the title appearing at the head of
this article, they might better have chosen a title suggested by Judge
Learned Hand in describing the process he went through in attempting
to decide a case involving a question of "doing business" by a foreign
corporation. Judge Hand stated that it was impossible to establish any
rule from the decided cases but rather "we must step from tuft to tuft
across the morass."' One authority states that the only general state-
ment that can be made with respect to the decisions defining "doing
business" or "transacting business" is that the cases are "numerous,
varied and inharmonious." 2 So with these cautionary ideas in mind,
we are off across the morass, and hope that we may come safely to the
other side, together with you, dear reader.
It is interesting and a trifle surprising in view of the present state
of the law to note that as late as 1839 the United States Supreme Court
stated that a corporation "must dwell in the place of its creation, and
cannot migrate to another sovereignty. ' 3 Apparently the first attempt to
exercise in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation occurred
in New York State in 1835, and this attempt was unsuccessful.4 By the
middle of the 19th century, however, the various fictions with which
we are all familiar were coming into vogue as bases for allowing suit
to be brought against a corporation in a jurisdiction other than that of
its incorporation. These fictions have been known under various names,
such as the "consent" theory, the "presence" theory, (whatever meta-
*LL.B. Marquette University Law School; Member: Milwaukee and American
Bar Association and State Bar of Wisconsin; Member of the firm of Fairchild,
Foley & Sammond, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
**LL.B. University of Wisconsin Law School; Member: Milwaukee Junior Bar
Association and State Bar of Wisconsin; Associate, Fairchild, Foley &
Sammond, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
'Hutchison v. Chase and Gilbert, 45 F. 2d. 139 (2d Cir. 1930). But then,
"Stepping From Tuft to Tuft Across the Morass" would probably not be too
informative as the title of a Law Review article.223 AM. Jun. Foreign Corporations §361 (1939).
3 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 519, 588 (1839).
4 Note, Federal Venue and Service and the Foreign Corporation in Diversity
Litigation, 30 IND. L. J. 324 (1955).
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physical meaning that word may have with reference to the incorporeal
corporation) and the "doing business" theory. Actually what they came
down to was that suit could be brought against a foreign corporation
either because it had expressly consented to suit by qualifying under
state statutes requiring such consent as a condition to qualification, or
because it had impliedly consented to suit by "being present" or
"doing business" in the state.5
II. THE McGEE CASE, ITS BACKGROUND AND IMPLICATIONS
A. The McGee Decision
Just how relevant any of these terms are at the present time is
questionable, in view of the decision of the United States Supreme
Court, rendered in December, 1957, in the case of McGee v. The Inter-
national Life Insurance Company.6 There Mrs. McGee had recovered
a default judgment against the insurance company upon a life insur-
ance policy issued to her son. In 1944 the policy had been purchased
from a predecessor of the defendant, and in 1948 defendant assumed
the insurance obligations of its predecessor and mailed a reinsurance
certificate to the son, offering to insure him under the same terms as
previously existed. This offer was accepted and premiums were paid
by mail from the son's California residence until his death in 1950. 7
Upon the company's refusal to pay the claim (on the grounds of
suicide), Mrs. McGee brought suit against the company in California
pursuant to a state statute subjecting foreign corporations to suit in
California on insurance contracts with California residents, even
though the corporation cannot be served within the borders of the
State of California. The only service attempted in the case was the
sending by registered mail of a copy of the process to the defendant's
principal place of business in Texas.
After securing a default judgment in California, Mrs. McGee filed
suit on the judgment in Texas but was refused enforcement of her
judgment on the grounds that the judgment was void as violative of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
8
Another ground for the Texas court's holding was that the California
statute in question was passed in 1949, after defendant and plaintiff's
son had entered into the reinsurance contract, and for that reason the
statute was in any event not applicable to the present case.9
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment
5 Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Non-Residents in Our Federal
System, 43 CORNELL L. Q. 196 (1958).
6355 U.S. 220 (1957).
7 No real emphasis is given to the fact that the insurance contract was "entered
into" in California. But see Chief Justice Warren's language in the very
recent case of Hanson v. Denckla, 2 L. Ed. 2d. 1283, at 1297, 1298 (June 23,
1958) which seems to indicate this was very important.




of the Texas court on both grounds mentioned.10 It stated that the
statute was merely remedial and procedural and for that reason the
time of enactment of the statute could not aid the insurance company.
But the point given prime consideration by the United States Supreme
Court, and the aspect of the case significant for our purposes, is the
square holding that the due- process clause did not preclude the
California court from entering a binding judgment against the de-
fendant insurance company.
The Court referred to International Shoe Co. v. State of Washing-
ton" as holding that where a defendant is not "physically present"
within the territory of the forum, due process requires only that de-
fendant have "certain minimum contacts" with the State so that
maintenance of the suit there does not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice". The Court had previously referred
to Pennoyer v. Neff,' 2 as establishing that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does place some limitations on the power of
State Courts to render binding judgments against persons not served
with process within the boundaries of the state. However, after
reference to International Shoe," the Court stated:
"Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is
clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of
state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other non-
residents."' 4
The Court attributed this trend to the transformation of the
economy of the United States over the years. It cited the increasing
number of transactions involving two or more states, the increasing
amount of business conducted by mail across state lines, and the im-
provements in transportation and communication making it less bur-
densome for a party defendant to defend in a state where it engages
in economic activity.
Probably the language which surprised most people in the McGee
case was the express statement by the Court that neither the defendant
insurance company nor the previous insurer apparently had ever had
any offices or agents in California, and that from the record, apparent-
ly the defendant had never solicited or done any insurance business
whatsoever in California, except for the particular policy involved in
the case.'
In fact, the only real limitation that can be read out of the McGee
case is that the Supreme Court would probably recognize a due process
10 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
1326 U.S. 310 (1945).
12 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
13 Supra note 11.
'4McGee v. The International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 2L. Ed. 2d. 223, at 226
(1957).
15 2 L. Ed. 2d. at 225.
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violation if the particular contract sued upon did not itself have a
connection with a resident of California. The court noted that it is
sufficient for due process purposes that the suit was based on a con-
tract which had "substantial connections"'" with California, and cites
as evidence of substantial connection the facts that the contract was
delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there and the
insured was a resident of the state at the time of his death.
B. Departure from "Doing Business" Concept in
McGee Case and by State Statutes
Under the McGee case, it is probably a fair statement that the term
"doing business" has no real significance with respect to the question
of whether service on a foreign corporation violates due process re-
quirements. It seems clear a foreign corporation need not be "doing
business" in a state in any literal sense of that term in order to be
subject to the jurisdiction of the state's courts with respect to trans-
actions having some "substantial connections" with that state. The
lie, then, has been given to this "chestnut", just as it was previously
shown a foreign corporation could be sued even if it didn't "consent"
thereto, and whether it was "present" or not.
This, of course, is not to say that the term "doing business" will not
still be used in court decisions. And, of course, it is used by many
states in their "service of process" and "qualification" statutes, so that
the statutory construction of the term "doing business" will still be a
matter for consideration. However, in view of McGee, there may well
be a reappraisal by state legislatures as to the desirability of the use
of the statutory term "doing business". To the extent that it may
have been considered in the past by courts and legislatures that due
process prevented a corporation from being sued in a state unless it
were "doing business" there in some regular and substantial manner,
the McGee case may well result in less use of this and similar terms
in state statutes.
It should be noted, for instance, that the California statute" in-
volved in the McGee case did not use the term "doing business,"
but rather made certain acts on the part of insurance companies
equivalent to appointment of the insurance commissioner as agent
for service of process. Included among such acts are soliciting applica-
tions for insurance contracts insuring the lives or persons of California
residents physically present in California at the time of issuance or
delivery of the policy; insuring property or operations located in
California; the issuance or delivery to California residents of such
16 See 2 L. Ed. 2d at 226. Cf. Hess v. Pawloske, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) ; Henry L.
Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 735 (1877).
1 CAL. INsURANCE CODE §§1610-1620 (1953).
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contracts; the collection of premiums thereon; and "any other trans-
action of business arising out of such contracts".
California is not alone in its departure from the "doing business"
terminology, and the departures are not restricted to the field of insur-
ance. In an article in a recent issue of the American Bar Association
Journal,c the author lists Alabama, Arkansas, Florida and New Jersey
as among the states with statutes subjecting foreign corporations to jur-
isdiction if they engage in business activities or have business trans-
actions within the particular states which do not necessarily amount to
"doing business" in the traditional sense. California, Colorado and
New York are stated to have statutes similar to the Illinois statute
providing for service of summons upon any party outside the state and
stating that such service is equivalent to personal service within the
state if the party served is a citizen or resident of Illinois or has
"submitted" to the jurisdiction of the courts of Illinois. The "sub-
mission" to jurisdiction by a nonresident is defined as including the
"transaction of any business within this state", the commission of a
tort in the state, the ownership, use or possession of any realty in the
state, and "contracting to insure any person, property or risk located
within this state at the time of contracting."' 9
Whatever constitutional due process question there may have been
with respect to the validity of the last-mentioned factor indicating
submission, is pretty well dispelled by the McGee case. It is also
interesting to note that the author of the ABA article20 indicates that
the term "transaction of any business" undoubtedly does not require
the traditional "doing business", and, accordingly, a single transaction
will probably be deemed sufficient. He also feels that solicitation in
Illinois by mail or other advertising, together with the delivery of the
product there, would probably support action against a nonresident in
Illinois.-"
C. Background of McGee in International Shoe and
Other Recent Supreme Court Decisions
The real implications of the McGee case can probably best be
understood in relation to the other United States Supreme Court cases
in this general field during the last fifteen years. The International
Shoe case has been referred to previously," and is, of course, the
landmark case setting the Supreme Court and all the courts of the
18 Wham, An Expanding Concept: Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents, 44
A.B.A.J. 422, at 423, 424 (1958).19 With respect to the Illinois statute, see Professor G. W. Foster's analysis in
WIsco sN BAR BuLLETIN (Dec., 1957) at 18.
20 See note 18 supra.
21For an excellent article discussing the McGee case, see Freeman, Mc-
Gee v. International Life Insurance Company and the Amenability of Foreign
Corporations to Suit, THE BUSINESs LAWYER (April, 1958) at 515.22 Supra note 11.
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land on the road to direct analysis of the contacts of the corporation
with the state, rather than a conceptualistic approach involving a
supposed "presence" of the non-physical corporation.
The limitation implicit in the McGee case, that jurisdiction based
on a single transaction "connected" to the state must be confined to
claims arising out of that particular transaction, is expressly discussed
in the International Shoe case. There, after rejecting the term
"presence" as a qestion-begging word, the Court stated that where
there occurs a single or isolated item of activity by the corporation in
the state, that is not enough to subject the corporation to suit on causes
of action unconnected with that activity. To require a defense based
on such unconnected claims was deemed to be too great and unreason-
able a burden upon the corporation involved to comport with due
process requirements.
23
All that is necessary for jurisdiction, however, is that the activities
carried on by the corporation be of such a quality and involve contacts
with the state by the corporation so as to make it reasonable to require
the corporation to defend there. Among the factors cited by the
Supreme Court as important there were that the shoe company had
carried on systematic and continuous activities in the State of Wash-
ington, had done much business there and had received benefits from
the state's laws and the right to use its courts to enforce its claims, and
that the obligations sued upon had arisen out of the very activities
mentioned. 2
4
Service in that case was made personally upon an agent of the
company in the State of Washington, and by registered mail to the
company's home office, and the court stated that both of these devices
gave "reasonable assurance" that notice would be actual and that such
is sufficient to comply with due process requirements.
25
Of interest in the International Shoe case is the separate opinion
of Justice Black, wherein he indicates that he dislikes the majority's
references to convenience, fair play and substantial justice, and that
he thinks the clear right of a state to open the doors of its courts for
its citizens to sue corporations whose agents are present transacting
business there, cannot be conditioned upon the ideas of the United
States Supreme Court as to natural justice. He also indicates that.
in his view, due process does not involve a question of "conveniences",
as the majority opinion implies.26 It is interesting to note that Justice
Black wrote the unanimous opinion in the McGee case 27 and there
23 326 U.S. at 317.
24The suit involved an action by the State of Washington to collect unemploy-
ment compensation payments relating to the dozen or so agents the company
had within the State.
25 326 U.S. at 320.
26 Ibid at 324-325.
27355 U.S. 220, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1957).
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expressly stated that while "there may be inconvenience to the insurer
if it is held amenable to suit in California where it had this contract"
this would certainly not amount to denial of due process . 2
It would appear, then, that any relevance to be given to the "con-
veniences" of suit in one state as opposed to another is to be considered
under doctrines of forum nonconveniens. It seems pretty clear that the
inconveniences of defending in a particular state are not going to im-
press the Court if raised in connection with due process arguments
directed toward defeating jurisdiction in a particular state. But this is
not to say that the conveniences of witnesses and parties will not be
considered when an attempt is made to change the place of trial.29
InTravelers Health Association v. Virginia,3" further development
occured, for in that case the company's contacts with Virginia were
by mail rather than by the actual presence of its agents there, and the
only service made was by registered mail on the insurance corporation
in Nebraska. The action there was brought by the State of Virginia
under its "Blue Sky Laws" to enjoin the company from soliciting
orders and selling insurance without a permit.
The Supreme Court, Justice Black writing the five to four majority
decision, stated the court's rejection of the narrow "consent" theory
and of the "doing business" theory dependent upon common law con-
cepts of place of contracting and place of performance. He stated that
what was important were the "consequences" of the contractual obliga-
tions in the state where the insured resided, and the "degree of inter-
est" of that state in seeing that such obligations were carried out.3 The
opinion also referred to prior decisions 32 calling unwise, unfair and
unjust a rule which would permit policyholders to seek redress only in
a distant state where the insurance company was incorporated. The
statement is made that due process does not forbid a state to protect
its citizens from such injustice.33
In holding that service by mail alone was adequate, the court cited
not only the International Shoe case but algo Mullane v. Central Han-
over Tr. Co.,34 where the court held that the minimum notice required
on the part of the trustee, to beneficiaries of a common trust fund
whose addresses were known, was mailed notice, and that publication
28 2L. Ed. 2d at 226.
29 For more on this point see Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based on Local
Causes of Action, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 522, at 542, 572, discussing forum non-
conveniens principles with respect to the significance of the inconveniences of
defending in a particular state.
30 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
31339 U.S. at 648.
32 Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407, 418, 419 (1905); Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Sprattey, 172 U.S. 602, 619 (1899); Cf. International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
33 339 U.S. at 649.
34 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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was not enough as to such persons. The Court in that case also indi-
cated that personal service was not necessary, even though such service
would insure actual and personal notice (though lacking in the power
of compulsion because made outside the jurisdiction of the particular
court.) 35
It is noted that in the Travelers case the majority opinion was that
of only four justices; Justice Douglas concurred in the result but
wrote a separate opinion and four justices dissented. It was this split
of authority which was referred to by the Texas Court in the state
decision36 appealed from in the McGee case, as basis for its declining
to hold that the service by mail made in the McGee case was sufficient
for purposes of due process.37 Whatever importance may have been
given to the split in the Travelers case, however, appears to be no
longer significant in view of the unanimous decision in the McGee case
(with the exception that Chief Justice Warren did not participate in
the case.)
Another United States Supreme Court case since International
Shoe important in connection with the "doing business" discussion, is
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.38 There the Court held
that the presence of the president of the defendant Phillippine corpora-
tion in the State of Ohio, together with the carrying on of the general
business of the company in that state during and immediately after
World War II, constituted activities sufficient to sustain service made
on the president in Ohio even though the cause of action sued upon
did not arise out of activities carried on in that state. The court stated
that it was clear Federal due process does not compel a state to provide
for service on foreign corporations at all, and that, a fortiori, a state
need not make provision for service broad enough to include jurisdic-
tion as to transitory actions not arising in the state, if it deigns to
provide for such service at all.39
Then addressing itself to the question whether due process pro-
hibits the exercise of such jurisdiction, the Court stated that it had
been squarely held in International Shoe that if an authorized repre-
sentative of a foreign corporation is "physically present in the state"
and engaged in activities appropriate to his receiving notice on behalf
of the corporation, there is no unfairness in subjecting the corporation
to the jurisdiction of the state courts by service upon him, with respect
to causes of action arising out of the activities carried on by the cor-
poration within the forum state.40 The next step was taken in the
3 Ibid at 319.
36 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 288 S. W. 2d 579 (Texas Civ. App. 1956).
37288 S.W. 2d at 582.
38342 U.S. 437 (1952).
39342 U.S. at 440.
40 342 U.S. at 445.
[Vol. 42
DOING BUSINESS
Perkins case, the Court holding that under the facts there involved
the activities of the corporation were sufficient to authorize service on
the corporate official in Ohio even though the cause of action arose
out of activities conducted elsewhere.
It is noted, however, that the Supreme Court remanded the case
to the Ohio Court because it was not clear whether the Ohio decision
was rested upon the mistaken view that due process forbade the sus-
taining of the service, or on an adequate state ground (that the Ohio
statutory requirements had not been complied with).
D. Lower Court Decisions Presaging and Following
McGee
As examination of the cases analyzed in a pre-McGee article 41 Will
indicate, the McGee case does not seem as "unprecedented" a decision
when read in the light of such cases as Zacharakis v. Bunker Hill Mut.
Ins. Co.,42 and Compania De Astral, S. A. v. Boston Metals Co.4 3
Those cases sustained personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations
in suits involving a contract which was really the only contact the
foreign corporation had had with the particular state. It is noted that
these two cases, along with several others,44 are cited in a footnote in
the McGee case following the statement that it is sufficient for due
process purposes that suit was based on a contract with substantial
connections with the state in question.45
The McGee case has been cited approvingly in several cases al-
ready.46 It was followed in a patent venue case.4 7 Probably the most
significant thing in this case is that it quotes the language from McGee
stating that the defendant insurance company never had any offices or
agents in California, and, so far as the record showed, had never done
any insurance business in California except for the particular policy
involved. It is this language which is the most striking thing about the
McGee case, and which will probably be often cited as support for the
proposition that only a single contact is necessary to sustain service
on a cause of action arising out of that single contact.48
41 Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based on Local Causes of Action, 1956 Wis. L.
REv. 522. This article thoroughly examines cases arising in the State and
Federal jurisdictions after International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and prior to McGee v. The International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).412281 App. Div. 487, 120 N.Y.S. 2d 418 (1953).
13205 Md. 237, 107 A. 2d 357 (1954).
44 Ace Grain Co. v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 95 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) ; Storey v. United Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.S.C. 1946); S. Howes
Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P. 2d 655 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1954); Smythe v.
Twin State Improv. Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. 2d 664, 25 ALR 2d 1193 (1951).
45 2 L. Ed. at 226.
4r Miklos v. Liberty Coach Co., Inc., 138 A. 2d 762, 766 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1958);
Askew v. Crouch, 250 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1958); Brooks v. Nat. Bank of
Topeka, 251 F.2d 37, 42 (8th Cir. 1958).
47 Kerr v. Port Huron Sulphite and Paper Co., 157 F. Supp. 685 (D.N.J. 1957).
48 Since the formal preparation of this article, the United States Supreme Court,
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11I. "DoiNG BUSINESS" TER--DIFFERENT MEANINGS IN
DIFFERENT CONTEXTS
Before going into an examination of the Wisconsin statutes and
a few of the more recent cases with respect to "doing business," it is
in a 5 to 4 decision, held that the Florida courts lacked jurisdiction to enter a
judgment purporting to extinguish interests in trust assets located outside
its borders. It then found the defendant corporate trustee had no office in
Florida, and transacted no business there, and none of the trust assets had
been held or administered in Florida. Since record disclosed no solicitation
of business in that State either in person or by mail, the "minimal contacts"
made a prerequisite to personal jurisdiction under International Shoe, 326
U.S. 310 (1945), were found not to exist. Hanson v. Denckla, 2 L. ed. 2d
1283 (June 23, 1958.) The Courts per Chief Justice Warren distinguished
McGee, 355 U.S. 220 (1957) by stressing that there the defendant solicited a
reinsurance agreement with the offer being accepted in and premium mailed
from California, while in the present case the cause of action did not arise
out of any act done or transaction consummated in the forum State. Also em-
phasized was the absence of any special legislation by Florida in exercise of
its "manifest interest" in providing effective redress for citizens who had been
injured by nonresidents engaged in an activity that the State treats as excep-
tional and subjects to special regulation. The Court here appears to recognize
the enactment of CALIFORNIA INSURANCE CODE §§1610-1620 (1953) as being an
important factor in the ratio decidendi of the McGee decision. Cf. Travelers
Health Asso. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647-649 (1950); Henry L. Doherty
& Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352
(1927).
It is also significant in this latest decision of the Supreme Court that the
execution in Florida of the powers of appointment under which the benefici-
aries and appointees claimed did not give Florida "a substantial connection with
the contract on which this suit was based." The Court states, (2 L. ed. 2d
at 1298) "The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with
a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the
forum State. The application of the rule will vary with the quality and
nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 319 (1945)."
Of interest in connection with the McGee and Hanson cases is the fol-
lowing excerpt from the Report of the Committee on Federal-State Relation-
ships as Affected by Judicial Decisions of the Conference of Chief Justices:
(U.S. News & World Report, October 3, 1958, p. 96).
"Also, in cases involving the in-personam [against the person] jurisdiction
of State courts over nonresidents, the Supreme Court has tended to relax
rather than tighten restrictions under the due-process clause upon State action
in this field. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, is probably
the most significant case in this development.
"In sustaining the jurisdiction of a Washington court to render a judgment
in personam against a foreign corporation which carries on some activities
within the State of Washington, Chief Justice Stone used the now-familiar
phrase that there 'were sufficient contacts or ties with the State of the forum
to make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair
play and substantial justice, to enforce the obligation which appellant has
incurred there.'
"Formalistic doctrines or dogmas have been replaced by a more flexible and
realistic approach, and this trend has been carried forward in subsequent cases
leading up to and including McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355
U.S. 220, until halted by Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. decided June 23, 1958."
The committee submitted this report in connection with the Resolution
adopted by the Conference urging the United Supreme Court to ". . . exercise
one of the greatest of all judicial powers-the power of judicial self-re-
straint .... Chief Justice John E. Martin of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
was one of the ten State justices on the Committee.
[Vol. 42
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probably well to note that the term "doing business" may well mean
different things in different contexts. The term has been used with
respect to questions of amenability to service and jurisdiction, taxa-
tion questions, questions arising under "qualifying" or licensing stat-
utes, and venue questions, among other things.49
The question whether the "business done" in a state by a foreign
corporation is interstate or intrastate is not important with respect to
whether the corporation can be sued there.50 In other words, the rule
appears to be that bringing suit against a corporation in a state where
it has even minimal contacts does not have any relation to the burden-
ing of interstate commerce, while taxing or requiring that corporation
to qualify in that state may well have such constitutional implications.
And Fletcher 5' states that a broader meaning is given to "doing busi-
ness" in taxation statutes than in qualifying statutes, and that the lat-
ter statutes generally give a broader meaning to the term than do
service statutes.52
The implications of the International Shoe5 3 case in tax cases will
probably be spelled out by the U. S. Supreme Court decisions in
Minnesota v. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co.,5 4 and Stock-
ham Valves & Fittings, Inc. v. Williams.55 The Minnesota Supreme
Court sustained imposition of the Minnesota income tax on the de-
fendant- Iowa corporation, using language reminiscent of Interna-
tional Shoe.56 The Georgia Court, however, held imposition of its in-
come tax on the foreign corporation concerned constituted a violation
of both the commerce and due process clauses of the U. S. Constitu-
tion. As this is written, these cases have not been decided by the
U. S. Supreme Court, but the decisions will likely be landmark cases
in this field.5 7
4 See e.g. 18 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§8709, 8712 (1955 Rev. Vol.),
stating that some courts have said a corporation may be "doing business" for
purposes of service of process, and yet not be liable to taxation, licensing or
other state regulatory provisions, because the latter would constitute an undue
burden on interstate commerce.50 See International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
51 18 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPoRATIoNs §8712, p. 399 (Rev. Vol. 1955).
-
2 For those especially interested in the taxation aspects of the doing business
problem, it is well to note that FLETcHER, ibid, indicates at §8804.2 that al-
though the International Shoe case (326 U.S. 310 (1945)) did not directly
relate to taxation, the principles there will probably be extended to tax cases
when the occasion arises. This step appears to have been taken by the Ver-
mont Supreme Court in a franchise tax case involving a New York brewery,
Ruppert v. Morrison, 117 Vt. 83, 85 A.2d 584 (1952). In fact, as noted in Rup-
pert, the International Shoe case also dealt with a tax question (unemployment
compensation tax), though chief consideration was given to the service
question.
53326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5484 N.W.2d 373 (Minn. 1957) probable jurisdiction noted in 355 U.S. 911, 2 L.
ed. 2d 272 (1958).
55101 S.E.2d 197 (Ga. 1957), cert. granted 78 S. Ct. 670 (March 17, 1958).
56 See 84 N.W.2d at 379-380.
57See 17 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §8465 et. seq. (1933) with
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As Fletcher"' notes, many decisions do not distinguish the con-
cept "doing business" as used in the various contexts mentioned above,
and sometimes indiscriminately cite cases involving, for example, "do-
ing business" for service purposes, in connection with questions involv-
ing "doing business" for qualification purposes. It would appear that in
view of the trend of the recent United States Supreme Court de-
cisions away from use of any symbolic concept, such as "presence"
or "doing business", these instances will occur less often and more
direct analysis will be required with respect to the particular problem
involved.
IV. DEVELOPMENT IN WISCONSIN
The Wisconsin statutes and decisions relating to "doing business"
can be divided into three main categories:
A. There are the statutory provisions under Wis. Stats., Chapters
180, 181, and 226 relating to corporations, stock and nonstock, and
foreign corporations. These provisions relate to the requirements for
qualification and also contain various provisions relative to service of
process.
B. Secondly, there are the provisions of Wis. Stats., sections 262.09,
.12 and .13 relative to service of process generally; these sections con-
tain provisions which are generally applicable to foreign corporations
and which should be considered when dealing with a service problem
involving a foreign corporation in Wisconsin.
C. Then there are the provisions of Wis. Stats., sections 200.03
and 201.43 involving services of process with respect to insurance com-
panies.
For ease of reference the above groupings of statutes will be desig-
nated "Corporation Law Statutes", "Service Statutes", and "Insurance
Statutes", respectively. It should be kept in mind that these titles are
somewhat arbitrary, as some statutes in the first category involve
service problems, etc. These categories will be discussed in the order
mentioned, and relevant cases analyzed after the statutory rules are
set forth.
A. Corporation Law Statutes and Decisions There-
under (Chapters 180, 181 and 226)
Section 180.82559 provides that service of process may be made on
a registered agent of a foreign corporation, or on the Secretary of
State of Wisconsin if a foreign corporation "authorized to transact
respect to "doing business" questions involving the requirement that a foreign
corporation "qualify" in a state. It is noted that in Perkins v. Benguet Con-
solidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), the United States Supreme Court
stated that the activities necessary for the sustaining of jurisdiction are not
necessarily the same as those stated in a state statute to be "doing business"
sufficient to require the corporation to secure a license in that state.
58 Ibid.
59 Wis. STAT. §180.825 (1957).
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business in Wisconsin" has designated no registered agent, or if such
agent cannot be found, or if the certificate of authority of the corpora-
tion has been revoked. If service is made on the Secretary of State,
he is required to mail a copy of the process to the corporation's prin-
cipal office. The section also provides that service thereunder can be
made only in actions arising out of or relating to "any business trans-
acted or property acquired, held or disposed of" within the State of
Wisconsin. If the address of the corporation is not readily ascertain-
able, the Secretary of State may publish rather than send the process
by registered mail. The section also indicates that there is no limita-
tion by virtue of the section on the right to serve a foreign corpora-
tion in any other manner "now or hereafter permitted by law".
It should be noted that subsection 1 of this section specifically re-
fers to foreign corporations "authorized to transact business" in Wis-
consin. Accordingly, it would appear that a corporation which has
not qualified (and is, therefore, not "authorized to transact business")
but which may nevertheless be "doing business" as the term is used
in other Wisconsin service statutes, would have no relation to
the above section. Service on such corporation would have to be made
under other provisions of law which will be discussed below.
The statute regarding what corporations are required to have a cer-
tificate of authority is section 180.801,60 which states that a foreign
corporation shall procure a certificate of authority before it shall
"transact business" or "acquire, hold or dispose of property" in Wis-
consin. However, the statute expressly states that no certificate of
authority need be procured for loaning money, taking notes, mortgages,
etc., if the foreign corporation first files with the Secretary of State
a statement constituting that officer as its attorney for service of pro-
cess in any actions arising out of any business done by the corpora-
tion in Wisconsin. The section refers to section 180.82561 for the
manner in which service of process should be made.
In subsection (3) of 180.801, the legislature has specifically set
forth a list of activities which do not constitute "transacting business,
or acquiring, holding or disposing of property" in Wisconsin, with
respect to the requirement that it procure a certificate of authority.
Among those activities are holding corporate directors' or shareholders'
meetings; maintaining bank accounts; maintaining stock transfer
offices; and soliciting or procuring orders by mail or through agents
or otherwise, where the orders require acceptance outside Wisconsin
before becoming binding contracts.
What effect, if any, will be given to the express statement that
merely soliciting or procuring orders does not constitute transacting
60 WIs. STAT. §180.801 (1957).
61 Supra note 59.
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business for purposes of the requirement that a foreign corporation
qualify, upon the construction of the term "doing business" as used
in Section 262.09,62 the general service statute? The indications are
that this is of no relevance when a question of amenability to service
is being considered. 6
3
Section 180.84764 provides the sanctions against a foreign cor-
poration which does transact business or acquire, hold, or dispose of
property in Wisconsin without acqurinig the required certificate of
authority. Prior to the 1951 revision, Section 226.02 (9)65 provided
that contracts made by unlicensed foreign corporations doing business
in Wisconsin affecting the liability of the corporation or relating to
property within the state were void on behalf of the foreign corpora-
tions, but were enforceable against them. The legislative revision
committee deemed this rule unduly harsh, however, and stated it was
not an aid to the purpose of the state of collecting fees due from
foreign corporations. Accordingly, the present statute merely pro-
hibits such a foreign corporation from using the Wisconsin courts
until it obtains a certificate of authority, and the validity of contracts
made by such corporations is not impaired in any way by their failure
to obtain a certificate. There are also provisions relating to penalty
fees for corporations failing to acquire certificates of authority when
required.
A new provision in 180.847 (4)6r similar to the provision for the
appointment of the motor vehicle commissioner of the state as at-
torney for service upon nonresident drivers, provides for service on
foreign corporations which transact business without a certificate of
authority, by service on the Secretary of State. "Transacting busi-
ness" or "acquiring, holding or disposing of property" in Wisconsin
without the required certificate is expressly stated to constitute the
appointment of the Secretary of State as agent for service of process.
The statute also provides that its provisions do not in any way limit
the right to serve under other provisions of law which may be ap-
plicable.
In Bulova Watch Co. v. Anderson,6 7 the lower court had sustained
a demurrer to the complaint on the basis that section 180.84768 pro-
hibited suit by a foreign corporation transacting business in Wisconsin
without a certificate of authority and that this prohibition went to the
corporation's capacity to sue. The Supreme Court, however, re-
62 Wis. STAT. §262.09 (1957).
63 See Huck v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minn. & 0. Ry. Co., 4 Wis. 2d 132 (May 6,
1958), discussed below in the body of this article.
64 WIs STAT. §180.847 (1957).
65 Wis. STAT. §226.02 (9) (1949).
66 Supra note 64.
6 7270 Wis. 21, 70 N.W.2d 243 (1955).
68 Supra note 64.
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versed on the grounds that it found no transaction of business in
Wisconsin by the corporation involved. The court stated that for a
corporation to transact business in a state "* * * it must be physically
present within the state in the sense of having an officer or agent there
who is performing some act on behalf of the corporation." 69 It ex-
pressly held that acts of the plaintiff Bulova in placing fair trade re-
quirements in the contracts made with its Wisconsin distributors and
the "carrying out" in Wisconsin of these terms, did not constitute
the transaction of business by Bulova.
Also cited by the Supreme Court in the Bulova case, and of in-
terest in connection with this general subject, is Section 180.849, 7
which provides that the prosecution or defense of an action in Wiscon-
sin courts does not of itself constitute transacting business in Wis-
consin.
Other statutes of general interest in this connection are Sec-
tion 181.6671 with respect to the "conducting of affairs" by foreign
nonstock corporations; Section 226.02572 with respect to "doing busi-
ness" by foreign corporations furnishing "affiliated" public utilities
certain services, equipment, facilities, etc., and providing for the ap-
pointment of the Secretary of State or designation of a resident agent
as attorney for service of process with respect to claims arising out of
transactions between the corporations and the public utilities with
which they are "affiliated"; Section 226.05,73 providing that the main-
tenance of deposits in bank accounts by foreign corporations in Wis-
consin is not "doing business" or "acquiring, holding or disposing of
property" in Wisconsin and should not be considered as a factor in
determining whether the corporation is "doing business" in the state,
or in determining the situs of the property or income of the corpora-
tion for tax purposes. The last statute, by its broad terminology,
would seem to have general applicability to any "doing business"
questions arising in any context in Wisconsin.
A Wisconsin case typical of many which arose under the previous
statute voiding contracts made by unlicensed foreign corporations
transacting business in Wisconsin, is Standard Sewing Equip. Corp.
v. Motor Specialty.7 4 There the Court held the statute in question
was not applicable where the transactions involved were all in inter-
state commerce, since a contrary holding would constitute an undue
burden on such commerce by a state. This rule will still have ap-
plicability, of course, with respect to contracts entered into prior to
69 270 Wis. at 27, 70 N.W.2d at 247.
7
0 Wis. STAT. §180.849 (1957).
71 
WIs. STAT. §181.66 (1957).
72 WIs. STAT. §226.025 (1957).
73 Wis. STAT. §226.05 (1957).
74263 Wis. 467, 57 N.W.2d 706 (1953).
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the 1951 revision of the statute; those contracts are void if the cor-
poration was not licensed but should have been. 7
B. Service Statutes and Decisions Thereunder
Wisconsin Statutes, Section 262.0976 is the general statute applic-
able to the personal service of summons on corporations. Sub-section
(1) provides that the summons may be served on a corporation by
delivering a copy thereof within the State of Wisconsin as provided
in the section, and that such service shall have the same effect as
personal service on a natural person. The methods of service au-
thorized by the section are expressly stated to be in addition to other
methods authorized by law. Sub-section (4) of the section provides that
a foreign corporation may be served under the provisions of Section
180.82577 (i.e., service on the registered agent or the Secretary of
State), or "by delivering within or without the state a copy of the sum-
mons to any officer, director or managing agent of the corporation."
Such service may be made, however, only if the corporation "(a) is
doing business in Wisconsin at the time of service, or (b) the cause of
action against it arose out of the doing of business in Wisconsin".
Examination of the history of this statute discloses that previously
it provided broader bases for service. From prior to the 1898 Statutes
through June of 1942, the statute provided (in Section 262.09(13) )T
that service could be made on foreign corporations by delivering a
copy of the summons and complaint to any officer in Wisconsin, or to
any agent in charge of or conducting business for the corporation in
Wisconsin, or to a trustee of the corporation, (1) if the foreign cor-
poration had property in the state, or (2) if the cause of action arose
in Wisconsin, or (3) if the cause of action existed in favor of a Wis-
75 In connection with this see 21 THE CORPORATION JOURNAL 123, listing Wisconsin
among the states having statutory definitions of what constitutes "doing
business" for qualification purposes. The note there indicates that the Erie v.
Tompkins rule, requiring, in essence, that Federal Courts apply state sub-
stantive law in diversity cases, is applied as to "doing business" cases involving
qualification so that if the state's statutes bar suit by an unlicensed foreign
corporation in a state court the same rule applies in the federal courts. See
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). See also page 183 in
the February-March, 1956 issue of the above periodical which lists six states
(Colorado, Florida, South Dakota, Washington, 'est Virginia and Wis-
consin) as having statutes prohibiting foreign corporations from transacting
business, or acquiring, holding or disposing of property in a state until they
have complied with the state's qualification requirements.
For those especially interested in the problem of "doing business" for
qualification purposes, see also Note, 1941 Wis. L. REv. 380 which analyzes
the Wisconsin cases to date with respect to this question. The author con-
cludes that the cases leave the matter questionable and that the best policy
for a foreign corporation wishing to insure the enforceability of its contracts
with Wisconsin residents is to secure a license to do business in Wisconsin.
See also C. T. CORPORATION'S What Constitutes Doing Business (1956) for a
state-by-state summary of the cases on this question.
76 Wis. STAT. §262.09 (1957).
,7 WIS. STAT. §180.825 (1957).
78 WIS. STAT. §262.09 (13) (1941).
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consin resident. It also provided that service could be made upon the
Secretary of State (4) if, but only if, the cause of action arose out of
business transacted in Wisconsin, or if defendant had property therein.
On July 1, 1942, by Wisconsin Supreme Court order, Section
262.09(13) was renumbered Section 262.09(4) .7 Thereafter, until
May 1, 1953, the statute provided for service on any of the persons
mentioned in the earlier law, (1) if the corporation had property in
Wisconsin, or (2) if the cause of action arose in Wisconsin, or (3)
arose out of business transacted in Wisconsin, or (4) if the cause of
action was in favor of a resident of Wisconsin.
However, effective May 1, 1953, Section 262.09(4) was repealed
and re-created in its present form. The Judicial Council comments
at that time indicated that the supposed bases for service relative to
having property in the state, and to a claim running in favor of a
resident of Wisconsin, were not adequate bases for personal jurisdic-
tion. The Council cited Pennoyer v. Neff,80 and Am. Jur.,8 ' as to the
invalidity of the first mentioned basis, and Restatement of Judgments, 2
and Consol. Textile Co. v. Gregory,3 as to the second basis.
It is noted that West's Annotated Wisconsin Statutes, in referring
to the above sub-section, indicates that it is to be read in connection
with Wis. Stat. §§180.825 and 180.847, which are discussed above.
Because of the express language in both of those sections indicating
that they do not limit or affect the right to serve under any other laws,
it would appear that Section 262.09(4) provides an independent basis
for service and that the elements stated in §180.825(1) are not rele-
vant under Section 262.09.
Among the recent Wisconsin cases construing this statute is
Mitchell v. Airline Reservations, Inc., 4 where the entrepreneur of a
Milwaukee ticket agency brought suit for conspiracy for breach of
contract, and service was attempted by serving the defendant's treas-
urer in the State of Wisconsin. An order quashing service was en-
tered and the plaintiff appealed from that order. In affirming the
lower court's order, the court cited cases holding that the mere phy-
sical presence of an officer of a corporation or of its agents or a sub-
sidiary dealing with its merchandise, is not sufficient to establish the
corporation's "actual presence here."8' 5 Although the court referred
to and quoted from the International Shoe case, it is noted that it used
the term "actual presence" in affirming the lower court's decision that
the corporation was not "doing business" sufficient to sustain service.
79 Wis. STAT. §262.09 (4) (1951).
so 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
8123 Ai . JUR. Foreign Corporations §489 (1939).
8 2
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §30 (1942).
S3289 U.S. 85 (1933).84265 Wis. 313, 61 N.W.2d 496 (1953).
85 265 Wis. at 318.
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While the decision certainly appears to be correct on its facts (the
treasurer had come into Wisconsin merely to confer as to shortages
in remittances for tickets the plaintiff had sold and apparently en-
tered the State at the plaintiff's request), the use of the term "presence"
might have been avoided in the interests of a mere precise analysis.
In Behling v. Wisconsin Hydro Electric Co.,86 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court reversed an order of the lower court setting aside
service on the interpleaded defendant-supplier of propane gas. The
court referred to Section 262.09(4) and its incorporation by reference
of Section 180.825, and said that no attempt had been made to serve
under the latter statute. The issue presented, then, was whether de-
fendant had been "doing business" in Wisconsin at the time of service.
(The issue could just as well, it appears, have been put in terms of
whether the cause of action arose out of its doing business in Wis-
consin).
Service of the amended summons and complaint had been made
on an employee of the interpleaded defendant at La Crosse, Wiscon-
sin, and one month later service of the amended summons and com-
plaint, and of defendant's answer and cross complaint, were made on
the president of the interpleaded defendant at its home office in
Minnesota. The lower court had held that the first attempted service
was not effective because the person served was not an officer, di-
rector or managing agent, and that the second service was not ef-
fective because the company's activities on the date of service con-
stituted interstate commerce and accordingly the corporation was not
doing business in Wisconsin as that term is used in Section 262.09
(4) .87
It would appear that the trial court's second ruling was based upon
failure to distinguish between the relevance of interstate commerce
considerations in qualification cases and its relative insignificance in
service cases. In any event, the Supreme Court8 8 cited Petition of
Northfield Iron Co.8 9 for the proposition that service could be made
upon a foreign corporation whose only activity in addition to soliciting
orders in the state was the filling of the orders through interstate
commerce.
The Court then summarized the activities of the interpleaded de-
fendant in Wisconsin as involving the maintenance of an agent there
who called on Wisconsin customers and prospects, procured financial
statements from prospects for forwarding to the interpleaded de-
fendant, and gave technical advice to customers in Wisconsin. The
86 275 Wis. 569, 83 N.W.2d 162 (1957).
87 WIs. STAT. §262.09 (4) (1955).
88 275 Wis. at 573.
89 226 Wis. 487, 277 N.W. 168 (1938).
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Court also indicates that the contracts in question were made in Wis-
consin, it appearing that the interpleaded defendant prepared the con-
tracts, signed them in Minnesota and then mailed them to the cus-
tomers who signed in Wisconsin. Although this factor is mentioned
by the Supreme Court, it is not specified as being a sine qua non to
sustaining service and is merely referred to in connection with a sum-
mary of the other activities of the corporation in Wisconsin."
The holding is that such activities, when added to the continuous
solicitation of sales in Wisconsin, constituted "doing business" in Wis-
consin under 262.09(4).
With respect to the method of service used, the Court directs its
attention to the second service on the corporate officer in Minnesota,
and states that personal service on him in Minnesota complied with
the Wisconsin statute and "certainly constitutes due process if service
by registered mail without the state does." 91 The International Shoe9 2
and Travelers93 cases are cited in support of the proposition that serv-
ice by registered mail is sufficient.
A recent case that should be examined is Prime Mfg. Co. v.
Kelly, 94 where a Virginia sales corporation's president acted as its
agent in Wisconsin, had offices here and had procured several tele-
phone listings in connection with its business. These activities were
deemed to amount to enough "more" than the mere maintenance of
an office for convenience in soliciting orders, to constitute "doing busi-
ness" under the service statute.
Also worth noting is Ludwig v. General Binding Corporation,95
wherein Judge Grubb of the Federal Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin stated that Section 262.09(4), 96 as well as ule 4(d) (3,7) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is broad enough to cover all
situations allowable within the confines of due process, citing the In-
ternational Shoe97 and Behling9s cases, discussed above. The Court
there held that the defendant corporation was not doing business in
Wisconsin where it owned no property there, and made no sales there.
It appeared that plaintiff sued on a contract executed in Illinois and
requiring that plaintiff perform in Illinois, and the Court stated that
the making of this contract did not constitute "doing business" in Wis-
consin. The activities apparently relied upon by the plaintiff in an at-
9 Behling v. Wisconsin Hydro Electric Co., 275 Wis. 569, 577, 83 N.W. 2d 162
(1957).91275 Wis. at 577.
92326 U.S. 310 (1945).
93 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
943 Wis. 2d 156 (1958).9521 F.R.D. 178 (1957).
9r WIS. STAT. §262.09 (4) (1955).
97326 U.S. 310 (1945).
98 Behling v. Wisconsin Hydro Electric Co., 275 Wis. 569, 83 N.W.2d 162 (1957).
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tempt to show the defendant was doing business in Wisconsin for
service purposes, constituted the furnishing of advertisements for its
wholly-owned subsidiary which did do business in Wisconsin, and the
sending of a sales instructor to that subsidiary in Wisconsin for train-
ing purposes. These elements were termed too "minor and sporadic"
to support service.
The Court did recognize the trend toward requiring less and less
for a foreign corporation to be deemed to be "doing business" in a
state, and cited Riverbank Laboratories v. Hardwood Products Corp 9
There Judge Duffy of the Seventh Circuit had held venue improper on
the grounds that the defendant was not doing business in Illinois, but
the Supreme Court reversed with a half-page per curiam decision
stating that the Illinois Federal District Court had been correct and
that service in Illinois was proper. There it appeared the defendant-
Wisconsin corporation had solicited orders in Illinois (the forum
state) but that the orders were accepted or rejected in Wisconsin.
But Judge Grubb deemed the activities there involved substantially
greater than those involved in the case before him, and accordingly
held service insufficient in Ludwig.'" It is not clear what the effect of
the McGee 0 1 decision might have been if it had been decided prior to
the Ludwig case, especially in view of Judge Grubb's statement that
the Wisconsin and Federal service statutes extend as far as due
process will let them. Can it be said the contacts in McGee were less
"minor and sporadic" than those in Ludwig?
But probably the most far-reaching Wisconsin decision in the field
is the most recent one, Huck v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minn. & 0. Ry. Co.,
et al.'10 . That case involved an appeal from an order of the lower
court quashing service on the interpleaded defendant, Chicago, Rock
Island and Pac. Ry. Co., because it was not "doing business" in Wis-
consin at the time service was made on one of its agents in Illinois at its
principal office.
The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that even assuming
the only Wisconsin activities carried on by Rock Island were soliciting
business here and maintaining an office in Wisconsin to aid in such
solicitation, these activities alone constituted "doing business" under
the service statute. The Court notes Rock Island has no tracks in Wis-
consin. Its Wisconsin activities consisted of maintaining an office in
Milwaukee; having a general agent, three traffic representatives, a
chief clerk and a secretary in Wisconsin; and soliciting freight and
passenger business by requesting agents of railroads operating in Wis-
99 220 F.2d 465 (1955), rvsd. per curiam 350 U.S. 1003, 1012 (1956), 326 F.2d
255 (1956).
100 Supra note 95.
101 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
102 4 Wis. 2d 132 (May 6, 1958).
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consin to route interstate shipments and passengers over the Rock
Island Line outside Wisconsin.
But the broad scope of this decision is best seen by noting the fol-
lowing language of the Court:
"Laying aside for the moment any consideration of con-
stitutional law and past court precedents defining the phrase
'doing business', there is no question but that Rock Island's
extensive activities in Wisconsin constitute the carrying on of
business in this state. As will be developed later in this opinion,
we are satisfied that a holding by this court, that such business
activities carried on in Wisconsin constitutes the 'doing of
business' within the state within the meaning of Sec. 262.09(4),
does not offend either the commerce clause of the United States
constitution or the due process requirement of the Fourteenth
amendment. This being so, the problem with which we are
faced narrows down to whether we should construe the statu-
tory words 'doing business in Wisconsin' liberally from a purely
rational and common sense approach, and hold that Rock
Island's activities within the state constitute the doing of busi-
ness here. Counsel for Rock Island strenuously contend that
we should not, but should interpret such statutory words in
the light of numerous past court decisions which have held
that mere solicitation of business moving in interstate com-
merce by a foreign corporation within a state does not consti-
tute 'doing business' within such state.
"We have no hesitancy in holding that the objective of the
statute was to give citizens of Wisconsin the right to make use
of the courts of this state in instituting causes of action against
any foreign corporation, which actually is carrying on business
activities within the state, subject only to such limitations as
are imposed by the United States constitution. We feel cer-
tain that neither the Judicial Council in proposing the changed
wording of sec. 262.09(4) nor this court in promulgating the
same, had any intention to hamstring such right by adopting
into such subsection any definitions of 'doing business' laid
down in past court decisions, which definitions contained limi-
tations which mistakenly were assumed to be required by the
United States constitution. ' 1.12 a
Although the McGee'0 3 case is not referred to in the decision, it would
seem clear from the language quoted that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court considers the present Wisconsin service statute broad enough
to cover any cases due process will allow.
The Wisconsin service statutes 04 relative to service by publication
are also of interest in this connection, for they provided prior to May
1, 1953 that service by publication could be made on a foreign cor-
poration if it had property in the state or if the cause of action arose
102a 4 Wis. 2d at 135-137.
103 Supra note 101.
104 WIs. STAT. §262.12 (1951).
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in the state. The invalidity of judgments against foreign corporations
having property in the state, insofar as personal relief against the cor-
poration is concerned, was recognized by the Judicial Council in 1952,
however, and the statute was changed to its present form which makes
clear that such judgments are limited to the claim of the defendant
to the property within the state.
See also Section 262.131 5 providing that where service by publica-
tion is authorized, delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint to
the defendant outside the state may be substituted for publication. It
would appear that the term "delivering" as used in Wis. Stat. Sec.
262.09(4) would require service by a process server, and that delivery
by the postman pursuant to registered mail would not be sufficient. This
seems true because Section 262.13 states delivery shall have the same
effect as a completed publication and mailing, and the statutes being in
pari materia, the term "delivery" in the former would probably also be
construed to mean more than delivery incident to mailing. In any
event, the prudent practitioner will not rely on delivery by mail under
Section 262.09(4) but will insure compliance by having the process
served.
C. Insurance Statutes and Attorney General Opinions Thereunder
The Wisconsin Statutes also provide in Chapters 200 and 201 a
specific procedure for service on insurance companies. Section 200.03
(15), (16)106 states that the insurance commissioner is considered the
attorney for service of process for all insurance companies admitted to
the state, with respect to process served upon companies while licensed
in Wisconsin and thereafter while any liabilities are outstanding against
the Company in Wisconsin. Service is made in a manner similar to
that made upon the Secretary of State.
See also Section 201.41107 which prevents any insurance company
from transacting "insurance business" in Wisconsin without first hav-
ing paid the license fees and obtaining the license required by law.
Section 201.43108 makes service on the insurance commissioner equi-
valent to personal service on the company and provides for the for-
warding of a copy of the process to insure actual notice to the com-
pany. Even if the corporation's license is revoked or it ceases to trans-
act business in Wisconsin, Section 201.43 (3) provides that service may
be made on the commissioner so long as liability under policies made
while transacting business in Wisconsin shall exist.
There are several Attorney General's opinions which are of interest
here. In an early opinion" 9 the same Travelers Health Association
105 WIs. STAT. §262.13 (1957).
106 Wis. STAT. §200.03 (15) (16) (1957).
107 WIS. STAT. §201.41 (1957).
108 WIS. STAT. §201.43 (1957).
1094 Op. ATr. GEN. 745 (1915).
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which was later involved before the U. S. Supreme Court, aroused
the interest of the Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner. He asked how
a summons and complaint served upon him with respect to the un-
licensed Travelers should be treated, and the Attorney General stated
that he should make the same disposition of this process as if the
Association were licensed in Wisconsin.
An earlier opinion 01 refers to a prior opinion, not cited, holding
that the solicitation of insurance by mail by a foreign insurance com-
pany's sending letters to Wisconsin residents violates the Wisconsin
Statutes if the Company is not licensed in Wisconsin. The opinion
states, however, that there is no way to make service in Wisconsin
where no agent can be found here, and suggests that a Federal statute
directed toward solving this problem would be desirable. The present
penalty section for receiving insurance applications or premiums in
Wisconsin without authorization, is Section 209.15.111
In any event, even with the respect to an insurance company that
was not licensed in Wisconsin, the Travelers Health 2 case before
the United States Supreme Court would seem to indicate that the
State of Wisconsin would not be powerless to prevent an unlicensed
insurance company's using the mails to solicit insurance from Wis-
consin residents. Legislation may be in order to cover this point.
V. FEDERAL SERVICE AND VENUE PROBLEMS.
As indicated by the Ludwig" 3 case the question of whether a cor-
poration is doing business in a state is also important for purposes of
Rule 4 (d) (3) and (7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Al-
though the rules did not specifically use the term "doing business"
they do provide that service may be made on a foreign corporation by
delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to an officer, a man-
aging or general agent, or an agent authorized by appointment or by
law to receive service for the corporation. Subsection (7) provides
that service may also be made in any manner prescribed by any United
States statute or any statute of the state where the service is made.
Rule 4 (f) states that the territorial limits for service of process are
the boundaries of the state where the district court issuing the process
sits, and extend beyond those limits when a statute of the United
States so provides.
Furthermore, the federal venue statute- 4 provides that, in diversity
cases, venue is properly laid in a district where all the plaintiffs or all
the defendants reside and provides" 5 that a corporation may be sued
1103 Op. ATT. GEN. 445 (1914).
111 WIS. STAT. §209.15 (1957).
112 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
13 Ludwig v. General Binding Corp., 21 F.R.D. 178 (1957).
14 28 U.S.C. §1391 (a).
"is 28 U.S.C. §1391 (c).
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in any judicial district where it is incorporated, licensed to do business,
or "is doing business". Such district is expressly stated to be deemed
its residence for venue purposes."lG
VI. THE FUTURE??
To what extent the iMlcGee case will broaden the already liberalized
principles as to amenability of a foreign corporation to service of pro-
cess in a state other than that of its incorporation is at this time still
in doubt. The unanimity of the decision in the Mc Gee case, together
with the previous decisions of lower courts sustaining service on a
"single contact" theory, seems clearly to indicate that due process is no
bar to suit against the foreign corporation in a state with which it may
have had only the contact involved in the particular lawsuit. What real
effect the Hanson case (a 5 to 4 split decision) will have in halting
this trend will no doubt be worked out in later decisions. The impact
of all this upon the statutory enactments of the states may well be in
line with the prediction of Judge Simon Sobeloff, when he stated,ls
after referring to the broad generalizations in terms relating to in-
dividuals as well as to corporations set out in International Shoe:
"These statements present the possibility of such an ex-
pansion of jurisdictional concepts in the future as to predicate
jurisdiction upon the doing of any act on account of which it
is reasonable for a state to open its courts.
"Everyone concedes, of course, that jurisdiction, grounded
upon a single act, must be limited to causes of action arising out
of that act. To subject the non-resident individual, or corpora-
tion, to a general in personam jurisdiction because of such li-
mited contact would be unfair and unreasonable, no matter how
adequate the notice."
Mr. Sobeloff makes the further point that the states need not go
to the limit of their permissible power, whatever the scope of the
International Shoe liberalizations might be. He suggests considera-
tion of a state statute providing for a broad personal jurisdiction based
upon the carrying out of some regular and sustained business activi-
ties within a state, and a supplemental statute providing for a limited
personal jurisdiction based upon and restricted to claims arising out
of an isolated transaction. He cites the Illinois and North Carolina
statutes as examples of this course of action, but notes that the North
Carolina Supreme Court recently held its statute did not apply to
116 See Note, Federal lPenue and Service and the Foreign Corporation in Diver-
sity Litigation, 30 IND. L. J. 324 (1955) for a discussion of the federal venue
and service problems arising, and for the statement that although the Inter-
national Shoe case (326 U.S. 310 (1945)) arose in connection with a question
of service, recent cases have applied its doctrines with respect to the test
of "doing business" under 28 U.S.C. §1391 (c).
117355 U.S. 220 (1957).
118 Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Non-Residents in Our Federal
System, 43 CORNELL L. Q. 196, 207-208 (1957).
[Vol. 42
DOING BUSINESS
the case at bar in Putnam v. Triangle Publications'" on the grounds
that the defendant did not have that minimum connection with the
State necessary, and that to hold otherwise would raise serious ques-
tions as to its constitutionality.
It may well be that the next cases in this field will better spell out
just what the limitations of due process are as applied to these "single
transaction" service statutes. 20 In any event, because of the decision
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Huck'2" case, it seems clear
that the Wisconsin Court will construe our service statute as broadly
as the principles of due process will allow. For this reason, the cases
to come from the United States Supreme Court and other Courts as
to the limits due process imposes, will be directly relevant to service
problems in Wisconsin.
One question not answered by Huck is whether service on a foreign
corporation in Wisconsin, based upon that corporation's having only
the contact with Wisconsin out of which the claim arose, could be
sustained under the present statute? Huck did not go that far, for
there the Court referred to Rock Island's "extensive activities in Wis-
consin". Pretty clearly whether such a "one contact" situation would
be deemed "doing business" under Section 262.09(4) would be a mat-
ter of statutory construction (or, more precisely, of "court-rule con-
struction") only; that due process does not bar jurisdiction based on a
single contact was settled by the final arbiter in McGee. But it could
be argued with reason that the present language ("doing business")
would have to be stretched beyond its ordinary meaning to sustain
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation having only a single contact
with Wisconsin. Probably a change in the language of Section 262.09
(4) would be desirable if the policy is to be to sustain jurisdiction in
a single transaction case.
The present state of the law appears to be that due process allows
a foreign corporation to be sued in a state, even though the only con-
tact the corporation has with that state is the one sued upon. But that
contact, if the only one, limits the claims that can be sued on there;
claims not connected with that contact cannot be sued on there, ac-
cording to just about everyone's idea of the remaining limits of
due process in this field. When there is more than just the single con-
tact, however, it becomes a question of studying all the contacts, and
they may be sufficient (a la Perkins 22) to sustain jurisdiction even as
to claims unrelated to the contacts with the particular state.
"L 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
120See Hanson v. Denckla, 2 L. ed. 2d 1283 (June 23, 1938) discussed at note 48
above for the United States Supreme Court's emphasis on the absence of such
a statute as one basis for its holding.
1214 Wis. 2d 132 (May 6, 1958).
122 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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